Abstract: This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. This hypothesis is tested by introducing a new indicator. On the basis of 136 countries, various versions of an indicator of international delegation are highly significant for explaining variation in countries' credibility. The effect of international delegation on credibility is particularly strong among the group of lower income countries (N=60).
Membership has its privileges -On the effects of delegating powers internationally 1 Introduction
Membership in international organizations is often considered to have beneficial consequences for their member countries -as well as for the international community at large. The WTO is supposed to enhance international trade, the IMF is supposed to stabilize the international financial system, the UN are supposed to increase security and peace to name but a few possible examples. But what do we really know about the consequences of being a member in international organizations? In a recently published paper, Rose (2004) was unable to show that GATT/WTO membership had increased international trade. In this paper, we are interested in a slightly different question, namely whether membership in International Organizations (IOs) increases the credibility of member countries -and thus confers privileges onto their members.
It has often been pointed out that it can be a disadvantage to be too strong (e.g. Weingast 1993) . A state that is strong enough to protect private property rights and to enforce private contracts is also strong enough to expropriate private wealth. This could be called the dilemma of the strong state. Rational subjects know this and will therefore invest less than they would if they could be sure that the state will not misuse its strength. States that have not had the chance to build up a reputation as being an impartial arbiter will be especially affected. In such cases, the creation of domestic independent agencies will often not be a credible commitment because such agencies can be abolished with relative ease. It might therefore be rational for these countries to delegate relatively more powers internationally. Majone (1996, 12) has even argued that "credibility, rather than the legitimate use of coercion is now the most valuable resource of policymakers." It will be asked if policy-makers can "buy" that resource by delegating powers internationally -or whether they will have to "make" it on the nation-state level. Levy and Spiller (1994, 210) have dealt with the issue of regulatory commitment and have hypothesized that countries that do not have an independent judiciary will have difficulties to develop regulatory systems which attract substantial levels of private investment. In such cases, "alternative mechanisms of securing commitment (like international guarantees) will be necessary (ibid.)." Increasing one's credibility via international delegation appears a plausible idea. Yet, we know very little about the economic effects of such delegation. This paper aims at providing some preliminary answers to the question whether international delegation of competences increases government credibility.
Three different indicators to measure the degree of international delegation that a government has committed to are constructed. On the basis of 136 countries, all three indicators are highly significant for explaining the observed variation in the countries' risk ratings that are used as a proxy for credibility here. This is the case even after controlling for other variables such as openness, government consumption, outstanding debt or the debt-to-export ratio. For low income countries (N=60), membership in international organizations has particularly important effects. Thus, membership does seem to have its privileges, especially if one is poor. Ratification of the New York Convention and membership in ICSID (the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes) are particularly conducive to boost credibility.
In this paper, the delegation decisions of governments are taken as exogenously given. We are thus not interested in explaining delegation decisions but in the consequences of delegation decisions. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section contains a number of arguments in favor of the presupposition that the international delegation of powers could have credibilityenhancing effects. Section three proposes a number of ways to make international delegation measurable -and thus comparable. In section four, our estimation approach is presented, section five contains a discussion of the results and section six concludes.
Why Should International Delegation Enhance Credibility?

Some Theory
Credibility can be an important asset of a government. If a government that promises to enforce private property rights is credible, then actors will invest more than if the government was not credible. Higher investment levels translate into additional income. This, in turn, leads to higher utility levels for both the governed and the governing because higher (aggregate) income also means increased tax revenue. The credibility of a government can thus make everybody better off.
The separation of powers has often been discussed as a way to increase government credibility (Landes and Posner 1975 , Barzel 1997 , Tsebelis 2002 .
Beyond the conventional separation into the three functions of legislating, executing and adjudicating, the delegation to independent or non-majoritarian institutions has received a lot of attention lately (see, e.g. Majone 2001 or Voigt and Salzberger 2002) . Independent central banks are the most frequently cited example: on the long run, everybody profits from stable money. On the short run, politicians can, however, increase their popularity by increasing monetary supply.
If citizens expect this, the short-term positive effects will not materialize but the policy will nevertheless be costly because it will lead to a higher inflation rate.
Delegating monetary authority to an independent central bank can be interpreted as a solution to the problem of time-inconsistent preferences as introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . This problem is not unique to monetary policy but can be identified with regard to a variety of government policies including, e.g., environmental and competition policy. Correspondingly, many states have introduced independent agencies that are responsible for policies in these areas.
It would thus seem that rational nation state governments should aim at increasing their credibility by delegating some competence to independent agencies. Yet, creating such agencies and respecting their independence are not identical.
Decision-makers who are subject to time-inconsistent preferences and who have delegated decision-making power might be tempted to interfere with the decisions of their agents once a certain decision has to be made. Worse yet, unsatisfied delegators might simply get rid off their delegatees or even abolish the independent agency altogether. This problem has been coined "second order commitment problem" (Moser 1999 ). On a worldwide scale, the effective average term-length of both supreme court judges and central bank governors is substantially below the term-length to be expected according to the statutes of those agencies. 1 Formal delegation is thus not sufficient to solve the problem of time inconsistency. Hence the question is whether other institutional arrangements -like the delegation of competence to IOs -are more likely to make government promises credible.
Actors with time-inconsistent preferences will make decisions that are not in their own long-term interest. They thus have an interest in restructuring the relevant decision-making situations. Rational actors with time-inconsistent preferences will try to transform simple promises (e.g. to enforce private property rights) into The effective average term-length of the members of the Supreme Court of Paraguay between 1960 and 1990 has, e.g., been a mere 1.1 years (Henisz 2000) . Many states have judiciaries that are formally quite independent. But de facto judicial independence is only loosely correlated with de jure independence (the correlation coefficient between the two being 0.22; see Feld and Voigt 2003) . This means that the credibility of government promises is often not substantially enhanced by a formally independent agency although this is one of its functions. credible commitments by modifying the relevant payoffs. If, once the time has come to honor or break one's promises, honoring one's promises leads to higher utility than breaking them and this is common knowledge among the participating actors, a simple promise has been transformed into a credible commitment.
One can think of the relevant interactions as a simple non-iterated game: in the first stage, government announces its policies (it could, e.g., announce to create private property rights and promise to enforce them), in the second stage, private actors make their investment decisions based on the credibility of government promises and in the third stage, government decides whether to honor its promises (enforce private property rights) or whether to break them (attenuate private property rights). After government has made its choice, the private actors can decide whether to take the case to court (stage four). If the court decides that government action was in congruence with its promises, the game is over. If the court, however, decides that government had broken its promises and that it was its duty to make up for it, the next stage follows in which government either accepts the court decision (i.e. makes up for the damage it has caused) or ignores the court decision. The government will ignore the court decision if that is connected with a higher utility level than implementing it. Continuing to solve the game backwardly leads Repetition of the game greatly increases the number of possible equilibria. Governments might -but need not -honor their own promises because they know that what they do in this round of the game affects private actor decisions in the next round of the game. Whether repetition makes governments comply depends inter alia on their time preferences.
The question thus is whether delegation of competence to IOs changes the payoffs in such a way that the government cannot make itself better off by breaking its own promises. We are thus interested in a comparative institutional analysis which compares domestic with international commitment capacities. In order to compare the two institutional alternatives, a look at a stylized game that could be played on the international level is necessary. Comparison of the payoffs will contain some information on likely equilibria.
The game tree of a game involving international delegation is quite similar to the one just discussed. In the international game the first stage does not simply consist of announcing a policy but announcing a policy by joining an international organization. If the respective IO has a court, stages four and five are exactly identical with those of the domestic game, if it does not, the decision whether a memberstate has played by the rules of the organization (has honored its promises) can be taken by some other actor (such as a general assembly). Just as in the domestic game, here too, governments have the option not to implement the decision made by the IO. If that was the last stage of the game, the likelihood of government implementing the (court) decision would prima facie not seem substantially higher than in the game played domestically. Yet, it can be argued that the international game consists of one more stage in which the other member states of the IO decide whether and how to sanction a government that ignores the decision made in stage five of the game. Possible sanctions include the freezing of financial aid, the refusal to make further concessions on trade issues, an economic embargo and -as ultima ratio -even the threat to go to war. Given a sufficiently high probability of being subject to sanctions, implementing the (court) decision might well prove to have a higher payoff than ignoring it.
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If all actors are rational and this is common knowledge, it is hard to explain why government would promise to enforce private property rights in the first place.
It could be argued that the domestic game also entails a seventh stage, in which the voters or the public could sanction government by, e.g., refusing to re-elect it, criticizing it in the press etc. One would then have to compare the expected value of the domestic sanction with that of the international sanction. If the expected value of the international sanction (but not that of the domestic one) leads the government to choose the implement-the-court-decision strategy, the international delegation of competence can be expected to have a credibility-enhancing effect. 3
It might be worth while pointing out some of the possible implications of these two games with regard to their capacity to enable governments to make credible commitments. We now turn to formal sanctions. Here stages seven and four are crucial.
Assuming that bringing suit is costly, one has to ask for the incentives to do so. If private actors -in the domestic version of the game -expect government to ignore court decisions, incentives to bring suit would appear to be very low. If state actors -in the international version of the game -cannot expect to be better off as a consequence of bringing suit, the corresponding incentives to bring suit would appear to be similarly low. 4 Sanctioning rule breakers is usually costly, the provision of sanctions thus amounts to the production of a public good and its provision can therefore not be taken for granted. The delegation of competence to IOs will be interpreted as a credible commitment to play by the rules of the organization only if rule-breaking behavior is sanctioned with high probability. The track-record of the IOs in sanctioning rule breakers is an important indicator in this regard: bailing out 4
One incentive for nation-state governments to bring suit could be their desire not to appear weak after other have reneged upon them.
countries or prolonging credits although conditionality requirements have not been fulfilled reduces the value of membership in such an organization in terms of credibility gains for the respective country because rule-breaking behavior is not costly. It can thus not serve to increase a country's credibility. Given that the threat of IOs in sanctioning non-complying governments is sufficiently credible, governments will prefer to implement court decisions. This, in turn, will induce more actors to bring suit in the fourth stage of the game as they can expect that a favorable court decision will indeed make them better off.
Having to suffer substantial losses in utility after having broken a rule cannot only increase the likelihood of governments honoring their promises but also their desire to exit from an IO. High costs of sanctions can thus only be expected to increase credibility if exit is sufficiently costly. If the international delegation of powers can be reversed at low or even zero cost, delegation cannot be expected to increase credibility. Only if a government has to incur substantial costs if it tries to "renationalize" a policy competence can the delegation decision be expected to be interpreted as a credible commitment and hence to increase government credibility.
To sum up: some theoretical possibilities for why the commitment capacity of governments could be enhanced by delegating some of their powers internationally have been described. In a nutshell, the idea is that by voluntarily tying their hands, governments can make themselves better off. Conventional wisdom has it, though, that IOs are hugely inefficient and ineffective organizations. The question thus is whether one can show empirically that some of the theoretically possible effects do play a role, that membership in IOs does indeed improve governments' capacity to credibly commit themselves -and that membership hence does indeed have its privileges. In order to do so, the possible transmission channels will be spelled out in the next sub-section, followed by some considerations how they can be put to an empirical test in section 3.
Possible Transmission Mechanisms
If delegation of competence to IOs enhances the commitment capacity of nationstate governments, then countries that are members in the adequate IOs should enjoy a higher credibility than non-members, c.p.. This should show in a number of objective variables such as the respective interest rates and (foreign direct) investment but also in more subjective variables such as country risk and creditworthiness rankings as well as security of property rights evaluations.
At the end of the day, we are not interested in subjective evaluations but in hard facts. It seems plausible to assume that high levels of government credibility should also be conducive to (foreign direct) investment as well as to low interest rates ( Figure 2 ). The security of property rights should be positively correlated with high levels of total factor productivity. All of these positive effects should lead to increased rates of economic growth and, over time, to higher levels of income.
The two dotted lines indicate two possible endogeneity problems. It could be the case that countries with high incomes have fewer difficulties of joining IOs than countries with low incomes. Secondly, it could be the case that countries that enjoy higher credibility levels have fewer difficulties of joining IOs than countries with bad country risk ratings. Possibilities to control for these potential endogeneity problems will be discussed below.
This section has presented the basic economic rationale for delegating powers internationally. Some possible cost components that can result from not following the rules of the international game have been mentioned, many of them, however, very difficult to quantify. We therefore now turn to search for proxies that allow us to assess the effects of the international delegation of competence on credibility empirically. 
Making International Delegation Measurable
In order to find out whether the international delegation of competences can increase a country's credibility, one needs to devise tests with which that proposition can be assessed empirically. This section serves to sketch some possible tests but also to highlight some of the conceptual problems in devising such tests. Prima facie, it would seem straightforward to assume that the higher a country's overall degree of integration into the international community, the more credible its promises should be. A general indicator measuring some "integration degree" could consist of counting the number of IOs that a country is member of and to compare them with the membership numbers of other countries. This is We therefore developed a second indicator
• which is confined to IOs that are active on a global scale, • which is confined to IOs that put some weight on the protection of property rights and possibly endow individuals with standing before international dispute settlement mechanisms and
• that takes "degrees of membership" explicitly into account. Ratified conventions within these IOs that promise to be either particularly relevant for the protection of private property rights or to indicate a high degree of earnestness, e.g., because membership implies monitoring by international groups, sanctions are severe etc. are explicitly recognized.
This leads to an "unweighted" indicator. We further developed a variant of the unweighted indicator that does not simply count whether a country is member of our subset of IOs or not but that counts the number of years it has already been a member. This variant thus takes into account explicitly the possibility that the length of membership could have an effect on the degree of credibility it conveys. 5 This is the "weighted" indicator. Thus, the unweighted indicator simply adds up the number of "qualifying" organizations which a nation-state is member of. The weighted indicator, in turn, weighs membership with the number of years that a country has been member.
Membership in the following IOs and -more specifically -in the following conventions has been taken into account in the construction of the indicator:
(1) Membership in the GATT/WTO; membership in this IO reduces the discretionary leeway of governments with regard to trade policy. Recently, membership in the WTO has become almost universal which means that little variation results. In order to pick up some variation, we did not only count the number of years that a state has been a member of GATT/WTO but also the number of commitments that it has ratified within the framework of GATS in the weighted version of the indicator. 6 Market access is not equivalent to the protection of private property rights. But broad market access enables property rights owners to use their property where it promises the highest return. It further enables foreign investors to rely on least cost suppliers with regard to both goods and services.
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Remember that the credit cards of the organization that claims that membership had its privileges also contain the information "member since x" suggesting that longer membership translates into more privileges, i.e. higher credibility. 6 We normalized this aspect by first identifying the country with the highest number of commitments among all memberstates. This number (162) was then set at 100% and all other memberstates were given values reflecting the percentage of commitments that they had made in comparison to the state with most commitments. The number of GATS commitments is, however, not weighted with the number of years that they have been in force.
(2) Membership in the IBRD (The World Bank) has also become quasi- rights. It could even be argued that some of them are inimical to the protection of private property rights. We have decided to take both covenants into account also in order to be able to compare the two effects on credibility.
Variation can be further increased by counting the states that have agreed to the so-called optional protocol in which they promise to abolish capital punishment. Ratification of this optional protocol is not directly related to property rights issues but can be interpreted as a signal of a government's earnestness to implement the rules it has agreed to. Further, it is taken into account whether a government has ratified the "Convention on the For the unweighted indicator, membership in an IO is coded "1", whereas non- This variable was only recognized in the unweighted version of the indicator. Countries accepting ICJ jurisdiction with reservations were coded .5. Additionally, it would, of course, be interesting to take into account to what degree various countries factually implement ICJ dicta. But over the course of its existence, the ICJ has only pronounced some 100 decisions, which does not seem to be a sufficiently large base for that type of information.
indicator. The appendix contains both the various indicator values and the descriptive statistics concerning the indicators.
Estimation Approach and Data Description
The purpose of this paper is to make first steps in answering the question whether the international delegation of competence reduces the credibility problems of governments. In the last section, a number of possible proxies for the degree of international delegation have been discussed. We now turn to possible indicators of our endogenous variable, namely the degree of credibility that is conjectured to be influenced by the degree to which governments have delegated competence internationally.
Two possibilities to proxy for "credibility" or "changes in credibility" factors that might influence a country's capacity to repay a large debt but that would be very difficult to control for using objective controls (Keefer and Knack 2003) . 8 8 With regard to creditworthiness ratings, Keefer and Knack (2003, 173) cite a study by Feder and Ross (1982) who show that out of a sample of 78 Euromarket loans for 34 countries, the interest rate spread was strongly and inversely correlated with the creditworthiness ratings, controlling for maturity and length of the grace period. They (ibid.) also cite a study published by the General Accounting Office of the U.S. in 1994 that found the creditworthiness indicator similarly strongly related to the discount on 38 sovereign debt instruments, owed by 21 countries, which were traded on secondary markets. Keefer and Knack draw on another creditworthiness rating which is, however, very highly correlated with the one used here.
In this study, the following indicators will be used: a modified version of the country risk ratings produced by Euromoney and the indicator on the security of property rights produced jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal within their Index of Economic Freedom on an annual basis. The choice of the country risk ratings as a proxy for a country's credibility is based on the assumption that good risk ratings imply that a government's announcement to pay back loans as agreed upon is evaluated as credible.
Euromoney's risk ratings are based on the view of experts, heads of syndication and loans, as well as data from the World Bank, forfaiting houses and credit rating agencies. To obtain the overall country risk score, Euromoney assigns a weighting to nine categories. These are political risk (25% weighting), economic performance (25%), debt indicators (10%), debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), access to short-term finance (5%), access to capital markets (5%), discount on forfaiting (5%). We use a modified version of the indicator as some of the components included in Euromoney's risk ratings seem to belong on the right hand side of the equation because they explain country risk. Good economic performance should, e.g., lead
to an improvement in the risk rating. The components used here are: (i) Political risk, which comprises the risk of non-payment or non-servicing of payment for goods or services, loans, trade-related finance and dividends, and the nonrepatriation of capital that is evaluated by the risk analysts. It thus reflects the perceived probability of governments breaking some of their promises; (ii) the credit ratings assigned to sovereign ratings from Moody's, S&P and Fitch IBCA, and (iii) the discount on forfaiting reflecting the average maximum tenor for forfaiting and the average spread over riskless countries such as the US.
In all three categories, higher values mean higher credibility. For simplicity, the weighting introduced by Euromoney is not changed which means that countries can maximally score 40 (=25+10+5) points. Some of the other categories (such as income per capita) also contained in the Euromoney data will be used as control variables to be discussed below. For this study, the country risk data for March 2003 were used.
Country risk ratings typically reflect the views of outsiders to a country. Yet, if membership in IOs increases the commitment capacity of governments, this should also be reflected in the domestic perception of the security of property rights. This is why the indicator "property rights" as provided in the Index of Economic Freedom is chosen as an alternative endogenous variable to the modified country risk ratings. The indicator can take on values between 1 (best) and 5 (worst) and is available for more than 150 countries. The data used are for the year 2002.
In order to ascertain whether high values in IO membership lead to high credibility ratings, we estimate the following equation:
where "Y" can stand for either country risk or property rights as just described.
The vector "M" consists of the variables usually used to explain the dependent In section 2.2, two potential endogeneity problems have already been mentioned, the first one consisting in the possibility that high incomes could make it easier to become a member in IOs and the second one that high credibility ratings could make membership easier. These possibilities are controlled for here by putting a lag between the independent and the dependent variable: the second and third indicators of IO membership are based on the year 1998 whereas the credibility ratings are based on the year 2003.
indicators add less explanatory power. 10 Yet, International Delegation III has the highest t-value which is why subsequent regressions draw on this version of our indicator.
- The huge differences in the coefficients between International Delegation I and International Delegation II and III are due to differences in their coding: International Delegation I is based on the raw number of international organizations a state is member of (France scoring the maximum 88 here), whereas indicators II and III are based on data normalized between 0 and 1.
indicator is used, results turn around in the sense that it is highly significant for explaining the risk ratings of rich countries but only moderately so for explaining them with regard to poor countries. This could be interpreted as an encouraging result for poor countries as they can actively influence the number of IOs that they are member of whereas to see their weighted indicator increases they will just have to wait for time to pass by. It could be the case that some countries have particular difficulties in becoming members of IOs, e.g., if they are very small (and have few diplomats who could negotiate membership) or have a poorly educated population (and have few competent diplomats). The size of the population as well as the average number of years in school are controlled for in columns 4 and 7. Both variables have the expected sign but do not reach conventional significance levels when tested together with International Delegation I whereas the population variable is highly significant when tested in conjunction with International Delegation III.
-TABLE 3 AROUND HERE - Table 3 reinforces the preliminary insight that membership has its privileges. It contains both economic and political control variables. As expected, higher government consumption is negatively correlated with country risk ratings; the international delegation indicator remains, however, significant on the one percent level. The other two economic variables, namely total debt and the debt-to-export ratio, are not significant. Stability, a political variable, also has the expected sign but does not reduce the significance level of the international delegation indicator.
After having controlled for a number of economic as well as political variables, we can thus be fairly confident that membership does indeed have its privileges.
-TABLE 4 AROUND HEREIt is now interesting to ask whether membership in different IOs has differential impacts on countries' risk ratings. Table 4 contains the answer to this question.
Uniformly controlling for GDP per capita, OECD membership and ethnic fractionalization, ratification of the New York Convention and membership in ICSID have the most significant impact on risk ratings. These results are in line with intuition as both institutions seem to enhance the protection of property rights.
-TABLE 5 AROUND HEREWe now turn to shortly describe the results using property rights instead of country risk ratings as the endogenous variable. Remember that lower scores mean better results here. All in all, estimation results are quite similar to those with the country risk ratings as endogenous variable. As before, membership seems to be particularly beneficial for the poor countries (column 6 of table 5). Table 6 reveals that the economic controls are generally more significant than before, but the international delegation indicator always remains significant on the one percent level. Table 7 shows that ICSID membership and ratification of the New York Convention are conducive to property rights. These results further reinforce the finding that membership in IOs can be beneficial.
Conclusion and Outlook
We have constructed three variables indicating the degree to which countries are members in IOs. Membership is interpreted as a partial delegation of decisionmaking competence to the international level and an attempt to make policy announcements more credible. Using two alternative endogenous variablesnamely country risk ratings and property rights -it was shown that membership in IOs has positive effects on both variables. Since significance levels remain high even when controlling for a number of economic as well as political variables, we conclude that the impact of IO membership is quite robust.
Nevertheless, this paper can only be the first step in estimating the credibilityenhancing effects of IO membership. It would, e.g., be interesting to estimate the costs of exiting IOs explicitly. On a more fundamental level, the sanctioning machinery of IOs deserves more explicit analysis: how does it work, how has the right to use it been applied, who has incentives to do so etc.
Concerning the estimations, time-series analysis is desirable. Is it possible to show that changes in the IOMEMB variable have led to subsequent improvements in the credibility ratings? Euromoney has published its country risk ratings ever since 1982; first on an annual basis and since 1993 bi-annually. One problem is that the number of countries covered in the early years was rather low.
The main goal of this paper has been to lay the foundations for estimating the effects of an international delegation of power for the credibility of national The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. Openness is defined as (imports + exports)/GDP. Openness and government consumption information from the Penn World Tables, Total debt and debt/export-ratio from the World Bank, stability from Kaufmann et al. (2003) and reflects the perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. The Property Rights Index is taken from the Heritage Foundation.
1) The adjusted R² of this equation without the variable "International Delegation III" is nearly 0. The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals. The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated tstats, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and K. -S. the two-side P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test on normality of residuals.
1) These two variables are also insignificant when regressed in isolation. 
